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THE LAW OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE
In her teachings on marriage the Catholic Church has
ever remained immutable. What she holds today she held
yesterday and will always hold. She teaches that marriage
is a natural, moral and religious contract which had its origin
with God in the Garden of Eden when He made them male
and female and said to them: "Increase and multiply."
It is a natural contract since it is ordained by the law of
nature for a well defined purpose, which purpose precedes
all human intervention, and it remains a contract while be-
coming a Sacrament under the law of Christ; moral, be-
cause it is governed by the moral law of God; and religious,
because it is instituted for the service of God in its end and
object. Moreover, as to its civil effects, which are separate
and distinct from the contract of marriage itself, it is a civil
contract. That the Church recognizes the civil nature of the
marriage contract may be deduced from the following
canon:
Baptizatorum matrimonium regitur jure non solum divino,
sed etiam canonico, salva competentia civilis potestatis circa
mere civiles eiusdem matrimonii effectus.
The marriage of baptized persons is governed not only by
the divine law, but also by the canon law, with due regard
to the competency of the civil authority concerning the
purely civil effects of matrimony. The civil effects here
considered are dower rights, the right of succession, prop-
erty rights between husband and wife, the rights of infants
to titles and property, and like material matters.
The limitations and powers of the secular law are as fol-
lows: (1) No State has any power to legislate concerning
1 All canons herein are taken from 5 AuGUSTINE, A COMMENTARY ON THE
NEW CODE OF CANON LAW (1923).
2 CANON 1016.
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Marriage.as a Sacrament, since this is a purely spiritual mat-
ter; (2) Neither can the State establish impediments, either
prohibitive or invalidating; (3) The State may, however, set
up laws governing the civil effects of' marriage and prescribe
a civil form to be followed by the contracting parties under
penalty; (4) The State may, for a time and for sufficient
reason, prohibit marriage or its consummation, at least in-
directly, as, for example, to soldiers; and (5) Under no
condition may a State claim the right to enact laws that
clash with the natural or divine law, whether a marriage
of a baptized or an unbaptized person is concerned, since
the State is subject to these laws and not superior to them.
The above rules obtain only when the parties concerned
are baptized Christians. With these it is impossible to
separate the contract of marriage from the Sacramenf.
Hence, if the parties have been baptized, and the marriage
is valid in all other respects, they have received the Sacra-
ment, whether they will it or not. With the unbaptized,
the situation changes. As the Church claims no jurisdic-
tion over the unbaptized, either the individuals or the State
regulate their marriage; but since individuals are frequently
motivated by self-interest, it would be ruinous to the State
to leave so vital a matter to them. Hence, to the legiti-
mate civil authority alone does the right belong so long a-
its laws are not contrary to the natural or positive divine
law.
Catholic ethics concerning marriage, independent of its
consideration as a Sacrament, flow necessarily from the
natural law, which law is the same for all. Neither the
State nor the individual is above it. The Church then
is the first to recognize that marriage has its civil con-
sequences; that the State acts wisely within its jurisdiction.
Moreover, She insists that Her faithful observe the regula-
tions that the State has ordained. But while admitting
that t.he State has a right to regulate as to the formalities
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of marriage, She most emphatically reserves to Herself the
right of determining what is and what is not a valid mar-
riage contract. This She claims by divine right, since mar-
riage is a Sacrament, and the Sacraments are all under Her
jurisdiction.
In order to obtain a proper conception of the Church's
law on the indissolubility of the marriage bond, and the con-
sequent prohibition of absolute divorce, a clear and definite
knowledge of three types of marriage is required, namely,
an un-christian or legitimate marriage, a marriage ratum
and a marriage consummatum.
An un-christian or legitimate marriage is one that exists
between non-baptized persons. The Church teaches that
such a union, under certain conditions, may be dissolved and
even after consummation, ' by virtue of the Pauline Privi-
lege. This supposes: (1) That one of the parties to the
contract has been converted to the Christian faith; (2) That
the other party refuses to live with the converted party;
(3) Or that he refuses to the convert the free exercise of
the Christian religion; (4) The privilege, however, cannot
be used when the converted party leaves the other; (5)
Nor can it ever be used without a papal dispensation; (6)
The baptized party must question the other party whether
he is willing to live peacefully with his-christian consort; 4
and (7) The bond of marriage, however, is not dissolved
when the dispensation is granted but only when the baptized
party contracts another marriage. Should the infidel be
converted in the meantime, both are bound to live together.
One who has been granted the Pauline Privilege may re-
marry, and with the proper dispensation, may even marry
another un-baptized person. In such a case should the non-
baptized party afterwards endeavour to lead the Christian
3 1 COR. VII., 12-15.
4 This is known as the interpellation.
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into infidelity or otherwise act as described in the case of
the convert, the bond of marriage will hold and nothing
other than the death of one of the parties can free the other.
Marriage ratum is one validly contracted by two baptized
Christians but as yet has never been consummated. In this
situation, if one of the parties makes a Solemn Profession in
a Religious Order, the party of the second part is free to
contract another marriage. The reason for this is because
as yet they have not become "one flesh" but rather are
united by a spiritual bond.'
In the above two situations, the dissolution takes place
only after the ecclesiastical court of the diocese of the re-
spective parties has examined the cause by judicial pro-
ceedings and pronounced sentence. In the case of dis-
solution by papal dispensation, a grave and sufficient reason
other than the mere non-consummation must be alleged.
There is no power on earth other than the death of one
of the parties capable of dissolving a consummated marriage:
To hold that adultery may dissolve the marriage bond is
repugnant to right reason, for why should one be permitted
to gain advantage to himself by reason of his wrong, and
this would be an advantage derived from sin if an adulterous
person could contract another marriage. Even the civil
law will not allow one to enrich himself by his own wrongful
act. It is not merely the ecclesiastical legislation that pro-
hibits divorce but rather the laws of nature and nature's
God. As I have already stated, this contract and its essen-
tial object have their origin in the law of nature, that is,
the purpose of this union is founded in the nature of the
5 As the consummated marriage is destroyed by the death of one of the
body, so the matrimonium ratum, which is only a spiritual bond, becomes dis-
solved by solemn religious profession, which is a spiritual death, by which one
dies to the world in order to live to God. St. Thomas.
If any one saith that matrimony contracted, but not consummated, is not
dissolved by the solemn profession of religion by one of the parties, let him be
anathema. Council of Trent.
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human species, and the natural law in this, as in other human
activities, is a participation in the rational creature of the
eternal law of God. From the very dawn of creation, it has
been the immutable law of God that marriage should be the
union of one woman with one man, but man priding himself
on his intellect and incited by passion that would put the
brute to shame, has sat in judgment on the eternal decree
of God and declared that marriage the most tender and
sacred of all human relations should be degraded to a tran-
sient society of profit and pleasure with the result that his-
tory is full of dissolutions of the marriage vow by fickle
passion and cold-hearted ambition.
I will not attempt a historical investigation of the law of
divorce due to the difficulty of acquiring historical truth.
For "even if history in general were as certain a thing as
many believe it to be, we could still acquire from it little
reliable knowledge of former divorce laws, to the original
records whereof we have not access; since only from such
records can we ascertain truly what are our own contempo-
rary ones." I Furthermore, since divorce has been explicitly
abrogated in the New Dispensation by the words of Christ,
"Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry .another,
committeth adultery against her. And if the wife shall put
away her husband and be married to another she committeth
adultery." A delving into the pre-christian era would
avail naught. This paper then will consider divorce from
the view point of Christianity. The term divorce, as used
here, is to be understood as divorce a vinculo matrimonii,.
which carries with it the privilege of marrying another.
Divorce a mense et thoro, being in reality no divorce at all.
If we consider marriage as a purely natural contract, for-
getting entirely its sacramental nature, it seems evident
that this contract, after the manner of all other contracts,
6 1 BISHOP, MARRLAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION (1891) 36.
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cannot be dissolved at the discretion of either of the parties.
Since the resulting obligation is the issue of their joint
consent, nothing other than a mutual consent can dissolve
that obligation. The reason for this is that whatever
right one of the parties has in the person of the other can-
not be taken away without the consent of the other party
whose right it is. Nowhere in the statutes of the various
states do we find divorce being granted by the mutual con-
sent of the parties. In fact the statute law frowns on such
a situation, but will not hesitate to do what the parties them:
selves cannot do, that is liberate either of the contracting
parties for some statutory reason. If the parties to the
contract cannot dissolve it by their mutual consent, it is
difficult to understand how the State can step in and say
the marriage bond no longer binds.
When we examine this question of divorce by the law of
nature, we must consider, "in the first place what sort of
contract the ends of marriage make necessary; whether
they can be effectually obtained by a contract which will
expire of itself, after a certain time, or may be dissolved by
the act of the parties at any time; or whether they require
that it -should be perpetual from the beginning, and in-
capable of being dissolved afterwards. Certainly, where a
man and a woman consent to be husband and wife, that is
where they enter into a contract of marriage, the ends which
they must, from the nature of the contract, have in view,
determine what sort of a contract it.is that they agree to.
If those ends require it to be perpetual and indissoluble,
their consenting to it, for the attainment of those ends, im-
plies, whether they express so much or not, that they consent
to be husband and wife forever. Nay, if the ends of mar-
riage require such a contract, though they should annex to
it any express condition, of being released after a certain
time, or of being at liberty to release themselves by joint
consent at any time, still such a condition would be void.
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If they have a will to enter into a contract, Which in its
nature is perpetual, they cannot at the same time, with any
effect, will any condition which should make that contract
not perpetual."
Now the ends of marriage are the mutual happiness of
the parties and the procreation of children. By establishing
this union, God intended to secure mutual help and support
between the contracting parties. Neither man nor woman
is complete and self sufficient alone. Nature has made one
dependent on the other. The woman being the weaker
needs someone on whom to lean. Man needs someone to
care for him. Man is characterized by greater strength and
energy; he seeks a sphere of worldly activity. Woman's
nature is sweet and mild, her sphere of work being confined
to the home. Thus their natures complement each other,
and in union each acts beneficially upon the other. Fur-
thermore each party will be more ready to comply with the
temper of the other, and correct whatever is amiss in their
own, when they are under the necessity of continuing to-
gether for life, than if they had the refuge of divorce, when-
ever they grew disagreeable to one another.
"As to the other end of marriage, which is the production
of children, it includes in it the duty of maintaining and
educating them in the best manner possible. Hence, those
who enter in a contract of marriage, with a view to this
end, must ipso facto be understood to bind themselves to
this duty. The care of educating their future children in
the best manner that they can, becomes by marriage, the
joint duty of the husband and wife. But this duty cannot
be carried on by their joint care, unless there is a union of
affection and interest; nor can there be such a union, where
they know from the beginning, that at a stated period the
mutual affections are to be withdrawn from each other, and
their interests to be separated. And much less can there
7 1 PAGE ON DivoRcE (1850) 37.
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be any effectual union when they are at liberty to withdraw
their affections from each other and to separate their in-
terests." 8 Since then one of the ends of marriage, and the
duty in which the other end of it engages the parties, require
that the contract should be perpetual, the consequence is,
that when a man and a woman enter into a contract of mar-
riage, they must, from the nature of the act, consent to make
that contract perpetual, because it is absurd to suppose that
they have a will to contract for such purposes as require
their obligation to each other to be perpetual and unalter-
able, and yet that at the same time they have a will to make.
that obligation temporgry and uncertain.
Marriage then is by its very nature a stable union. To
think otherwise is to disregard every dictate of reason and
nature. Man cannot reasonably be allowed the privilege
of paternity without also assuming its responsibilities; nor
can a woman find either reasonable or natural justification
in casting from her breast the child of her womb.
It has been- frequently asked, why this contract, since its
obligations are derived from the will of the parties concerned
in it, should not after the manner of other contracts, be
capable of being dissolved at the will of the same parties.
The only answer to this is the law of nature requires the
one to be perpetual while the other is not so. "Certainly
if the law of nature makes it necessary from the first, that
when two parties marry, the contract of marrying into which
they enter shall be perpetual, the same law will forever con-
tinue to forbid them .to dissolve that contract, after they are
entered into it. There is an absurdity in saying, that a
contract which is perpetual by its own nature, from the be-
ginning, may lawfully be dissolved at any time by the con-
sent of the parties who are engaged in it. A man and a
woman are at liberty whether they will marry or not, but
if they will marry, they are not at liberty whether they will
8 PAGE, op. cit. supra -note 7.
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enter into a perpetual union or not. If they will marry,
they unite for such purposes as force them to contract for
life, since this quality of being perpetual is necessarily con-
nected with and inherent in the contract, it is not left to the
discretion of the parties, after they have engaged in the
contract, to change this quality by an act of theirs, and
thus make the contract temporary and precarious." '
The Church is not alone in recognizing the advantages
of indissolubility, as opposed to the right of divorce. David
Hume has beautifully demonstrated this truth in his essay
on Polygamy and Divorce. He says:
"If it be true, on the one hand, that the heart of man naturally de-
lights in liberty, and hates everything to which it is confined, it is
also true on the other, that the heart of man naturally submits to
necessity, and soon looses an inclination, where there appears an ab-
solute impossibility of gratifying it. These principles of human nature
may appear contradictory. But what is man but a heap of contradic-
tions. Though it is remarkable, that where principles are after this
manner contrary in their operation, they do not always destroy each
other, but the one or the other may predominate on any particular
occasion, according as circumstances are more or less favorable to it.
For instance, love is a restless and impatient passion, full of caprice
and variations, arising in a -moment from a feature, from an air, from
nothing, and suddenly extinguishing in the same manner. But friend-
ship is a calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason and cemented
by habit, springing from long acquaintance and mutual obligations,
without jealousies or fears, and without those feverish fits of heat and
cold, which cause such an agreeable torment in the amorous passion.
So sober an affection, therefore, as friendship, rather thrives under
constraint, and never raises to such a height as when any strong intent
or necessity binds two persons together and gives them some common
object of pursuit. We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the
marriage knot, which -subsists chiefly by friendship, the closest pos-
sible. The amity between persons where it is solid and sincere, will
rather gain by it, and when it is wavering and uncertain, this is the
best expedient for fixing it. How many frivolous quarrels and dis-
putes are there, which people of common prudence endeavor to forget
when they- lie under a necessity of passing their lives together, but
which would be inflamed into the most deadly hatred, were they pur-
sued to the utmost, under a prospect of an easy separation. In the third
"9 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 40.
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place, we must consider that nothing is more dangerous than to unite
two persons in all their interests and concerns, without rendering the
union entire and total. The least possibility of a separate interest
must be the source of endless quarrels and suspicions. The wife, not
secure in her establishment, will be driving some separate end or
project; and the husband's selfishness, being accompanied with more
power, may still be more dangerous." 10
Paley, writing on this subject says:
"As the duties which, by the law of nature, parents and children owe
reciprocally to one another, cannot be fulfilled except by the con-
tinued co-habitation of the parents, divorce, because it is at variance
with such obligations, is at variance with the natural law. But if
Ehere be no children, the objections to divorce rest on the grounds of
general expedience. The general utility of making the marriage con-
tract indissoluble during the life of .either party, may be proved from
its tendency to preserve the happiness of the marriage state, through
the advantage of a perpetual common interest. For if a separation could
take place at wi!l, the wife, because she is likely to suffer most from
separation, would endeavor to draw to herself a fund, in order to
guard against the evils of such anticipated divorce. This disunion of
interests would be followed by an alienation of affection, which would
be detrimental to both parties. But if she be secure from the chance
of a capricious separation, the same self-interest which, in the former
case, we said would lead to acts productive of misery to both, will lead
her to an opposite line of conduct, which would be productive of
mutual happiness.
"Again, an indissoluble contrhct tends to preserve the happiness of
the marriage state, by inducing a necessity of mutual compliance. A
man and woman in love with each other, do this insensibly. But when
love is wanting, nothing will go half so far with the generality of
people, as the one intelligible reflection, that they must make the best
of their bargain. Therefore, through necessity, they promote the
pleasure of each other, and this will soon become a habit so easy and
natural, that it will procure them a repose and satisfaction sufficient
for their happiness. Besides, as by the constitution of nature, love
is not a durable passion, whatever attraction either party may have
once seen in the other, will be impaired by possession. And as the
desire of novelty can be checked only by the known impossibility of
obtaining the object. that check should, in this case, be adopted for
its utility; because it supplies to both sides, by a sense of obligation
and mutual interest, what satiety has impaired of possession and mutual
attachment. But it may be said that divorce by mutual consent
10 HumE, POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE, EssAY 19.
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would not be exposed to the same evils. But we must consider the
indelicate situation, and the prospective misery, to which the dissenting
party must be exposed, if the other party has the right to ask her for
an agreement to such a plan. The law of nature or of the land,
rather, admits a divorce as a remedy for some provable acts, but not
as a relief from imaginary grievances, such as dislike, temper, jealousy,
and other sources of annoyances, because such objections may always
be asserted by one party, and cannot be disproved by the other, and
the admission of them as a plea for divorce, would destroy at once the
marriage contract. This consideration of the extent of the mischief
which would result from a latitude in the power to divorce, is the best
answer to those persons who, like Milton, advocate the right to dissolve
a marriage on the ground of mutual dislike. For if it be said, that the
happiness of both would be best conserved, by the dissolution of a
connection disagreeable to both, -it may be replied, that as the ex-
tension of the rule would produce more misery than its limitation can,
the general consequence must not be sacrificed for the benefit of the
individual exception." 11
'The Church realizes that there might be cases where the
refusal of divorce will bring about individual hardship; but
this results not from the laws of God forbidding divorce but
rather from man's selfish nature, and man must bear the
consequence. The evils that come to individuals because
they cannot be divorced must be weighed against the far
greater and more numerous ills that result to society at large
because of divorce. When the welfare of society as a whole
demands something, the individual must yield. If we rea-
son that because a marriage might be a hardship to an in-
dividual it should be dissolved, we should also reason that
because a man is forced to labor in dire poverty he should
be allowed to steal wealth from his more fortunate neighbor.
Going to the defence of one's country is not necessarily the
most pleasant occupation in the world, yet under certain
circumstances we are forced to do it. The soldier by the
same rule should be permitted to desert the colors. The
prisoner should be liberated and given back his place in
society that he might enjoy himself. Life taken as a whole
is no bed of roses. Stern duty faces us on all sides. It
11 PALEY'S MORAL AND PoLrrIcAL PHILosOPHY, B. 3, pt. 3, ch. 5.
THE LAW OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE
is impossible to escape it. We conquer one struggle only
to encounter another, and the oftener we conquer the strong-
er we become. Hence, when God condemned divorce and
proclaimed that marriage could never be dissolved, He issued
an appeal to the fulfillment of duty, which no doubt requires
virtue, and sometimes even heroic virtue. It may be a hard
law; nevertheless it is a raw. If men were as reasonable
in the use of marriage as they are in the other things of life,
divorce would be unheard of. The evil desires of the flesh
are not satisfied-with one person. Concupiscence seeks not
the utility which nature intends. It seeks pleasure alone.
Satiated lust loathes its victim,-hence divorce.
Not unfrequently does one read in the newspapers of a
decision of the Sacred Roman Rota declaring invalid a
marriage of two individuals who have lived together as
husband and wife, with the result that many of our sepa-
rated brothers, as well as a great number of the faithful, be-
come bewildered and mystified. The inference drawn is
that the Church in reality admits of divorce. If individuals
were more given to clear thinking and simple reasoning,
instead of jumping at conclusions, especially concerning
matters of which they are totally ignorant, there would be
less cause for mystification. The whole difficulty arises
from the failure to distinguish between Divorce and Nullity.
Divorce admits that there actually existed a valid mar-
riage. Nullity denies that such a status ever existed, be-
cause some element necessary to a valid marriage was not
present at the time the contract was originally entered into.
That is, there was present, known or unknown to the parties,
a diriment impediment which made marriage impossible in
their case.
We will now consider the nature and effect of diriment
impediments since they play such an important part in the
law of marriage. A diriment impediment (nullifying) to
marriage is a personal incapacity in the individual which
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renders him or her incapable, from divine or ecclesiastical
law, of contracting marriage with anyone (absolute impedi-
ments), or of contracting marriage with a certain person
(relative impediments).
The absolute diriment impediments are the following:
(1) Those that are due to a personal defect which renders
one unable to promise with sufficient discretion (the im-
'pedfifint of age), or to perform what is promised (the im-
pediment of impotency); and (2) Those that are due to a
voluntary act which consecrates one to God with the ob-
ligation of perpetual celibacy (the impediments of Sacred
Orders and vows).
The relative diriment impediments are as follows: (1)
Ligamen or the bond of a previous marriage; (2) Disparity
of worship; (3) Abduction; (4) Crime; (5) Consanquin-
ity; (6) Affinity; (7) Public probriety; (8) Spiritual re-
lationship; and (9) Legal adoption.
AGE 12
(1) Vir ante decimum sextum actatis annum completum,
mulier ante decimum quartum item completum, matrimon-
ium validum inire non possunt.
(2) Licet matrimonium post praedictam aetatem con-
tractum validum sit, curent tamen animarum pastores ab eo
avertere iuvenes ante aetatem, qua, secundum regionis re-
ceptos mores, matrimonium iniri solet.
(1) A boy cannot validly contract marriage before he
has completed his sixteenth, and a girl before she has com-
pleted her fourteenth year.
(2) Although marriage contracted after the aforesaid
age is valid, pastors of souls should deter from it young
people who have not reached the age at which, according to
the custom of the country, marriage is usually contracted.
12 CANON 1067.
The canons are set forth in italics. The interpretation and discussion follow.
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The impediment is of ecclesiastical law, as regards the
determination of age, but of the natural law in so far as the
use of reason is demanded. Consequently, the Church may
dispense in the former but not in the latter.
IMPOTENCY 13
(1) Impotentia antecedens et perpetua, sive ex parte
viri sive ex parte mulieris, sive alteri cognita sive non, sivi
absoluta sive relativa, matrimonium ipso naturae iure diri-
mit.
(2) Is impedimentum impotentiae dubium sit, sive du-
bio iuris sive dubio facti, matrimonium non est impedien-
dum.
(3). Sterilitas matrimonium nec dirimit nec impedit.
(1) Anterior and perpetual impotency, whether in man
or woman, whether known to the other party or not, wheth-
er absolute or relative, renders marriage invalid by the very
law of nature.
(2) If the impediment of impotency is doubtful, wheth-
er the doubt be one of fact or by reason of the law being
doubtful, marriage should not be hindered.
(3) Sterility renders marriage neither invalid nor illicit.
Should the impotency-arise after marriage or lke only tem-
porary the marriage would not be invalidated. Impotency
that is relative only (in reference to one party only) does
not nullify except to a determinate person. This impedi-
ment is of the natural law.
SACRED ORDERS 4
RELIGIOUS PROFESSION "
Invalide matrimonium attentant clerici in sacris ordinibus
constituti.






Item invalide matrimonium attentant religiosi qui vota
sollemnia professi sint, aut vota simplicia, quibus ex speciali
Sedis Apostolicae praescripto vis addita sit nuptias irritandi.
Marriage is null, also, if attempted by the religious who
have taken solemn vows, or simple vows that have the force
of invalidating marriage by special disposition of the Holy
See.
In the Latin Church, subdeaconship, deaconship, and
priesthood render an attempted marriage invalid. This im-
pediment being a child of the ecclesiastical law, the Church
may dispense with it, but seldom or ever will. The impedi-
ment of Religious Profession originates in the sanction of
the Church and is therefore iuris ecclesiastici. It is to be
noted that sacred orders constitute a marriage impediment
not by reason of the concomitant vow of chastity, but mere-
ly by ecclesiastical law; whereas solemn profession is an
impediment by reason of the vow itself, and indirectly in
virtue of the ecclesiastical law.
LIGAMEN OR BOND OF A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE 8
(1) Invalidum matrimonium attentat qui vinculo tene-
tur prioris matrimoni, quanquam non consummati, salvo
privilegio fidei.
(2) Quamvis prius matrimonium sit irritum aut solutum
qualibet ex causa, non ideo licet aliud contrakere, antequam
de prioris nullitate aut solutione legitime et certo constiterit.
(1) Those bound by the bonds of a former marriage,
even though it was not consummated, attempt marriage in-
validly, excepting the privilege of the faith.
(2) Although the previous marriage be invalid or dis-
solved for whatever reason, it is not lawful to contract an-
other before the nullity or dissolution of the first has been
legally and certainly established.
18 CANON 1069.
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An exception to the law laid down in the above canon
is the case of the Pauline Privilege. But even here the
bond of the previous marriage remains till the second is
contracted. This impediment is of the natural and divine
law, and it binds all men, the unbaptized as well as the
baptized. No dispensation can be granted from this im-
pediment as long as it continues; and, moreover, those who
would contract a second marriage must offer proof that the
bond of the first marriage was non-existent, or that is has
ceased.
DISPARITY OF WORSHIP
(1) Nullum est matrimonium contractum a persona non
baptizata cunt persona baptizata in Ecclesia catholica vel
ad eandem ex haeresi aut schismate conversa.
(2) Si pars tempore contracti vzatrimonii tanquam bap-
tizata communiter habebatur aut e-hs baptismus erat du-
bius, standum est, ad normam, canon 1014, pro valore mat-
rimonii, donec certo probetur alteram partem baptizatam
esse, alteram vero non baptizatam.
(1) A marriage is null when contracted by a non-bap-
tized person with a person baptized in, or converted to, the
Catholic Church from heregy or schism.
(2) If the party, at th6 time of the marriage contract,
was commonly held to have been baptized, or if his or her
baptism was doubtful, the marriage must be regarded as
valid in accordance with canon 1014.8
The reason why the Church has made Difference of Wor-
ship an impediment is on account of the grave danger to
17 CANoN 1070.
•18 Matrimonium gaudet favore iuris; quare in dubio standum est pro mat-
rimonii, donec contrarium probetur, salve praescripto canon 1127.
In re dubia privilegium Jidei gaudet javore iuris. CANo 1127.
The law always favors marriage, and hence if a doubt arises as to the validity
of any particular marriage, the presumption is in its favor until the contrary is
proved (excepting the case of the Pauline Privilege Canon 1127).
In doubtful cases the law favors the privilege of faith, i. e., the liberty of the
convert to marry.
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which the Catholic party is exposed of suffering the loss
of his faith. The Church will grant no dispensation in such
a case unless there are written promises made to the effect
that the religion of the Catholic party will not be menaced,
and that all children born of such a union shall be brought
up in the Catholic faith.
ABDUCTION 19
(1) Inter virum raptorem et mulierem, intuitu matri-
monii raptam, quandiu ipsa in potestate raptoris manserit,
mullum potest consistere matrimonium.
(2) Quod si rapta, a raptore separata et in loco tuto ac
libero constituta, illum in virum habere consenserit, impedi-
tnentum cessat.
(3) Quod ad matrimonium nullitatem attinet, raptui
par kabetur violenta detentio mulieris, cum nempe vir mulier-
em in loco ubi ea commoratur vel ad quem libere accessit,
villenter intuitu matrimonii detinet.
(1) Between the abductor and the woman abducted
with a view to marriage there can be no (valid) marriage
as long as she remains in the power of the abductor.
(2) If the abducted woman, having been separated
from the abductor and restored to a place of safety, con-
sents to have him for a husband, the impediment ceases.
(3) As far as the nullity of marriage is concerned the
violent detention of a woman is equivalent to abduction,
when, namely, a man violently detains her with a view to
marriage, in the place where she dwells or to which she has
repaired of her own accord.
This impediment is founded upon natural law, inasmuch
as it affects the freedom of consent. But the formal side
of the impediment is strictly ecclesiastical or human.
29 CANON 1074.
THE LAW OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE
CRIME 20
Valide contrahere nequeunt matrimonium:
(1) Qui, perdurante eodem legitimo matrimonio, adul-
terium intre se consummarunt et fidem sibi mutuo dederunt
de matrimonio ineundo vel ipsum matrimonium, etiam per
civilem tantum actum, attentarunt;
(2) Qui, perdurante pariter eodem legitimo matrimonio,
adulterium inter se consummarunt eorumque alter coniugi-
cidium patravit;
(3) Qui, mutua opera physica vel morali, etiam sine
adulterio, mortem coniugi intulerunt.
There can be no valid marriage between:
(1) Those who, during the same legitimate marriage,
have committed adultery With, and promised marriage to
each other or attempted it, even by a merely civil act
(promissio cur adulterio);
(2) Those who, during the same legitimate marriage,
have committed adultery together and one of them conjugi-
cide (uno machinante et adulterio);
(3) Those who, even without adultery, caused the death
of a partner by mutual co-operation, either physical or moral
(utroque machinante absque adulterio).
This impediment is of ecclesiastical origin and as such
does not affect infidels. The object of the impediment is
to safeguard the fidelity and rights of married people, and
to punish those who resort to adultery or murder in the hope
of a new marriage.
CONSANGUINITY 21
(1) In linea recta consanguinitatis matrimonium irritum
est inter omnes ascendentes et descendentes tum ligitimos
tum naturales.
(2) In linea collaterali irritum est usque ad tertium




toties tantum multiplicetur quoties communis stipes mul-
tiplicatur.
(3) Nunquam matrimonium permittatur, si quod sub-
sit dubium num partes sint consanguineae in aliquo gradu
linea rectae aut in primo gradu lineae collateralis.
(1) In the direct line consanguinity invalidates 4mar-
riage between all ascendants and descendants, whether legit-
imate or natural.
(2) In the collateral line matrimony is invalid to the
third degree inclusively.
(3) In the oblique (or collateral) line, if both sides of
the line are equal, there are as many degrees as there are
generations on one side; if they are unequal, there are as
many degrees as there are generations on the longer side.
This impediment is of the natural law as regards the first,
and probably all other degrees of the direct line. In other
degrees, consanguinity is an impediment of the ecclesias-
tical law only. Hence, it may be dispensed with for weighty
reasons. I
AFFINITY 22
(1) Affinitas in linea recta dirimit ma.trimonium in quol-
ibet gradu; in linea collaterali usque ad secundum gradum
inclusive.
(2) Affinitatis impedimentum multiplicatur:
(1) Quoties multiplicatur impedimentum consan-
guinitatis a quo procedit;
(2) Iterato successive matrimonio cum consan-
guineo coniugis defuncti.
(1) Affinity in the direct line annuls marriage in any
degree; in the collateral line it annuls it to the second degree
inclusively.
22 CANox 1077.
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(2) The impediment of affinity is multiplied:
(1) 'As often as the impediment of consanguinity,
from which it originates, is multiplied;
(2) By successively repeated marriages with
blood relations of the deceased consort.
Affinity arises from carnal union, whether it be licit or
illicit. Hence, one cannot validly marry the relations of
one with whom he has had complete carnal relations. This
impediment is entirely ecclesiastical.
PUBLIC DECENCY 23
Impedimentum publicae honestatis oritur ex matrimonio
invalido, sive consummato sive non, et ex publico vel no-
torio concubinatu; et nuptias dirimit in primo et secundo
gradu linea rectae inter virum et consanguineas mulieris,
ac vice versa.
. The impediment of public propriety arises from invalid
marriage, whether consummated or not, and from public
or notorious concubinage. It annuls marriage in the first
and second degree of the direct line between the man and
the blood relations of the woman, and vice versa.
As the impediment is one of ecclesiastical law, the Church
can, and does, grant a dispensation from it for reasonable
cause.
SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP 24
Ea tantum spiritualis cognatio matrimonium irritat, de
qua in canon 768.
The only spiritual relationship that annuls marriage is
that mentioned in Canon 768.
This very ancient impediment arises from the sacrament
of baptism and invalidates marriage between the minister
of baptism and the person baptized, also between the spon-
sor and the person baptized. Reasons of respect and of




uals indecorous, and hence the Church from the earliest
times has ruled against it.
LEGAL ADOPTION 25
Qui lege civili inhabiles ad nuptias intre se iuenduas ha-
bentur ob cognationem legalem ex adoptione ortam, neque-
unt vi iuris canonici matrimonium inter se valide contra-
here.
Those who are by civil law considered as incapable of
contracting marriage with each other on account of the
legal relationship arising from adoption are, by canon law,
incapable of contracting marriage validly. Hence, in
countries where adoption is a diriment impediment, the
Church binds the faithful to the same extent as the civil
law.
VIOLENCE AND FEAR 28
(1) Invalidum quoque est matr.'monium initum ob vim
vel metum gravem ab extrinseco et iniuste incussum, a quo
ut quis se liberet, eligere cogatur matrimonium.
(2) Nullus alius metus, etiamsi det causam contractui,
matrimonii nullitatem secumfert.
(1) Marriage is invalid also when it is entered into be-
cause of violence or grave fear, caused by an external agent,
unjustly, to free himself from which one is compelled to
choose marriage.
(2) No other fear, even though it would give cause to
the contract, entails the nullity of marriage.
Marriage contracted under grave force or grave fear or
violence may be declared invalid, for, whatever is the result
of force, fear of violence destroys the free will of the party
concerned. A person, forced into making a contract un-
justly and unwillingly, might give a purely external and
fictitious consent to its terms, in which case,-at least in
conscience,-there would be no valid agreement. It would
25 C NON 1080.
26 CANON 1087.
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be intolerable if fhatrimonial consent, extorted by fear,
were allowed to stand.
ERROR SERVITUDE7
(1) Error circa personam invalidum reddit matrimon-
ium.
(2) Error circa qualitatem personae, etsi det causam
contractui, matrimonium irritat tantum:
(1) Si error .qualitatis fedundet in errorem per-
sonae;
(2) Si persona libera matrimonium contrahat cur
persona quam liberam putat, cum contra sit
serva, servitute proprie dicta.
(1) Error concerning the person renders a marriage in-
valid.
(2) Error concerning the quality of the person, even
if it is the cause of the contract, renders the marriage in-
valid only:
(1) When the error about the quality amounts to
an error about the person;
(2) If a free person marries one whom he sup-
poses to be free, but who in fact is a slave in
the true sense of the word.
Error as to the quality or character of the person (wheth-
er rich, poor, noble, or peasant) would not as a general
rule constitute error sufficient to invalidate marriage, but
if the quality is explicitly made a condition to the con-
tract, and the party in error limits his consent to a person
with a particular qualification, the error becomes substantial
as to the person and invalidates the marriage.
ERROR As TO THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE 28
Simplex error circa matrimonii unitatem vel indissolubili-
tatem aut a sacramentalem dignitatem, etsi det causam con-




A simple error as to the unity, indissolubility, or sacra-
mental character of marriage, even if it be the cause of the
contract, does not vitiate the matrimonial consent.
A simple error is one that proceeds merely from intellec-
tual apprehension, and has no formal condition or stipula-
tion attached to it, nor a formal act of the will excluding a
substantial feature of marriage. Error or ignorance con-
cerning the meaning of the marriage contract may be of
such a vital kind as to make true consent impossible. The
parties must at least realize that the primary end or pur-
pose of marriage is the begetting of children. An accurate
perception of all that the act of generation entails is not
necessary, but some knowledge of a general and confused
character, that begetting children results from this union
is certainly requisite. In this enlightened age marriages are
entered into with very curious notions. Some marry with
the express intention of preventing birth of children (the
primary object of marriage). Others with the intention of
getting divorced should the necessity arise. Should these be
made a condition to consent, the validity of the contract
would be very seriously questioned. It would be a question
for the Rota to decide from the evidence whether the inten-
tion to contract marriage is predominant, or whether the
consent is vitiated by reason of an immoral condition or
positive act of the will leveled against the primary object
of marriage or one of its essential properties.
This impediment belongs to the natural law because it
means the absence of consent, without which, according to
the law of nature, marriage cannot be contracted.
Should one knowingly or unknowingly enter into a con-
tract of marriage with any of the above impediments, his
marriage would be null or invalid ab initio. In other words,
there never was a marriage and never can be a valid mar-
riage until the impediment is removed. If the impediment
is one of the natural law, it cannot be dispensed with, and
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the marriage cannot possibly be. If it is an impediment of
ecclesiastical origin which the Church is not accustomed to
dispense, v. g., affinity in the direct line, it would be almost
a waste of time to seek a dispensation. The other impedi-
ments, for urgent reasons, can be dispensed with.
The policy of the Church in creating impediments is to
bring to the mind of the faithful that marriages affected by
them are altogether undesirable. In this matter the Church
is merely exercising the right of any society to protect its
members and however one sided and unjust this may seem
to non-members, it is perfectly logical and just. There is
then no reason for mystification when the Church permits
two who have been living as husband and wife to separate
and even re-marry. The Church does nothing more than
pronounce on a matter of fact. The validity of the union
is questioned, testimony pro and con is laid before the
Sacred Rota; witnesses are examined; and from the evi-
dence obtained the conclusion is reached that at the time
of the marriage some diriment impediment acted as a bar
to the validity of the contract. The marriage that seemed
to be a valid union was in reality no marriage at all.
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